biographical information and concluding statements about the idol's achievements.
They can also click on a caption next to the image of each idol to register a vote for which public figure they most admire. Voters can select only one idol per decade, with the total number of votes updated daily. An associated statement tells readers that 'the power of examples is infinite; each generation of youths has their own idols' ('Zhuixun xiandai Zhongguo' 2009) This paper interrogates and contextualizes the Idol website as a means to provide a preliminary account of the evolution of different historical conceptions of fame and celebrity in the PRC, and associated constructions of 'modern China. ' The Idol website is a useful starting point for understanding the evolution of conceptions of fame/celebrity in China for three reasons. First, in the absence of any definitive surveys or literature on the history of fame and celebrity in China from 1949 to 2009, it offers a cross-section of famous personages throughout the PRC's history that is as representative and inclusive as many other possible concise listings. This remains the case even though the suitability of the choice of famous individuals displayed on Idol is debatable, as it is decided unilaterally and possibly in an ad hoc fashion by anonymous website designers. Second, Idol's categorization of the PRC's history in terms of six generations offers broad insights into popular understandings of the values and aspirations of different groups of Chinese youth. I say 'broad' because referring to a generational decade as an homogeneous group with a common relationship to popular culture downplays the fact that young people experience different situations flowing from the specific social divisions and contexts associated with age, class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and urban and rural residency. Finally, Idol is a patriotic 'edutainment' website. Netizens 'searching' to understand modern China are enjoined to 'learn' that in contemporary China the historical experiences of the early PRC and the influences of global capitalism have converged to create a superpower that is driving the world economy and will help to shape the popular cultures of the future.
The next section briefly compares the narrative presented by the Idol website to popular models of the evolution of celebrity in contemporary media and cultural studies. The rest of the paper proceeds by charting, contextualizing and analyzing the website's stylized depiction of the evolution of celebrity in China on a chronological basis. The final section provides some concluding remarks.
Comparing evolutions
The history of idol worship in the PRC is portrayed in Idol's introductory narrative as shifting away from the collective admiration of socialist heroes of production towards the alienated adoration of commercial celebrities or idols of consumption (see Figure 1 ).
In the 1950s, China's youth reportedly idolized heroes (yingxiong), as symbolized by an image of Huang Jiguang, a revolutionary martyr. In the 1960s, they idolized political role models (mofan), as illustrated by an image of Lei Feng, a model soldier. In the 1970s, they idolized symbolic role models (yangban), as represented by an image of Li Tiemei, a revolutionary-opera character. In the 1980s, they idolized famous people or stars (mingxing), epitomized by an image of Zhang Haidi, author and Chair of China's Disabled Persons' Federation. In the 1990s, they idolized disaffected youth (fenqing), as symbolized by an image of rock star, Cui Jian. Today, they idolize celebrities, ordinary people who have performed no exceptional deeds (bu jingying) but are simply 'famous for being famous,' as demonstrated by an image of Supergirl Li Yuchun.
The idea that idol worship has evolved in a degenerative fashion is neither new nor unique to China. Daniel Boorstin (1972: 6) provides a classic example of this position when he denounces contemporary celebrities on the grounds that: 'their chief claim to fame is their fame itself.' Comparing modern-day celebrities in the USA with former process. Unable to leave but realizing that his comrades had already begun their advance, Dong held up the explosives and lit the fuse. His sacrifice enabled the communists to take the bridge.
Idol underscores the remarkable nature of Dong Cunrui's heroism by referring to his slight stature and poor background; unlike conventional heroes whose accomplishments are, in part, a function of their privileged socio-economic status, he is a people's hero who had the courage to make the ultimate sacrifice because of his love of the CCP and the Chinese people. Dong features in a 1955 movie, re-released as a DVD in 2008. He was upheld as a national role model during a campaign to 'Learn from the PLA' in the mid-1960s. He is also commemorated via various statues and memorials and on a website celebrating the eightieth anniversary of the PLA in 2007 ('Dong Cunrui' n.d., 2007 Cunrui' n.d., , 2008 'Geming yingxiong dianying' 1955; Gittings 1964 campaigns to promote those models also meant that all children and adults were emulating the same hero at the same time (Sheridan 1968: 47) .
In short, the CCP was a major creator of popular culture and youth icons at the time, (re)presenting revolutionary heroes for mediatized consumption to promote political cohesion rather than commercial goals. Idol's description of 1950s youth as a generation of young revolutionaries united in their admiration of authentic heroes is highly stylized; to the extent that this was true it was largely an effect of state control of the media and cultural production. Yet many of these idols have since been re-presented as emulation models via commemorative events and the distribution of feature films, as part of a campaign launched by the CCP in 1991, and expanded in 2004, to promote patriotic education by re-remembering the 'makers of the Chinese revolution' (Zheng 2008: 794-97) . Films and activities with patriotic content are promoted, especially during Chinese celebrations and holidays.
Political models
In the 1950,s and especially throughout the 1960s, the CCP began promoting a series of ordinary yet exceptional workers as political role models for young people to learn the spirit of the revolution and unify the nation. Such models embodied what it meant to be a good communist and imitating their personal example showed members of the public how to become one. Good communists were young people from poor backgrounds who, unafraid of hard work and adversity, selflessly served the Chinese people and the associated task of socialist development as best they could and in any manner that the CCP required. These models were promoted, along with the heroic 'makers of the revolution,' to create a new generation of 'revolutionary successors' for socialist China.
The Idol narrative consequently states that Chinese youth in the 1960s idolized political role models in the form of people who dedicated their lives to serving the people and national construction whole heartedly ('60 niandai' 2009 Chuanxiang (1915 Chuanxiang ( -1975 Lei Feng (1940 -1962 soldier) ; Wang Jinxi (1923 -1970 and Jiao Yulu (1922-1964, model cadre [1918] [1919] [1920] [1921] and, after his illness, used the written word to inspire others to become good communists ('Baoer Kechajin' 2009 ). Korchagin, a teenager transformed into a resolute revolutionary or an 'iron man' in 'the crucible of war and revolution,'
became a popular symbol of the Soviet 'new man' and a youth icon in early Maoist
China (Cheng 2009: 34, 36) . Chapters from the 'red classic' were translated into Chinese in 1937 and the entire text was translated in 1942, selling an estimated 2.07 rally people to work harder to overcome difficulties. Cadres were especially encouraged to follow Jiao's leadership style by investigating local conditions. In the early 1990s, Jiao became the subject of an award winning feature film ('Jiao Yulu' 1990 As with the revolutionary heroes of the 1950s, many of the political models of the 1960s are being re-remembered today via the creation of memory sites associated with the expansion of China's patriotic education campaign, such as websites, films, DVDs, video games, museums, historic monuments, sculptures and nostalgic memorabilia.
However, the PRC's rejection of Maoist politics in the early 1980s has ensured that the production and consumption of such role models has become disconnected from the particular conception of revolution and national identity that they once embodied.
Moreover, unlike the heroes of the 1950s who retain foundational importance for the PRC nation-state, the contemporary political relevance of idols of the 1960s has been undermined by their connection to a now-denigrated period in the CCP's history. With the exception of the odd television special, their presence in popular culture has mostly been reduced to circulating as niche market products for tourists in the form of revolutionary kitsch.
Symbolic models
The Cultural Revolution (1966-76 youth idolized 'symbolic role models' chiefly because they were provided with few alternatives, and describes the idols of that generation in collective terms as 'our idols' rather than 'my idol' ('70 niandai' 2009 ).
The 1970s webpage has two introductory notes that underscore the shift away from Contrary to the emphasis of state-funded writers on 'educating the masses,' Wang Shuo is a self-described 'literary entrepreneur' concerned with entertainment and sales, not morals or politics (Kong 2010: 131-36 ). Wang made his fame and fortune by publishing stories and novellas, many of which were adapted for film and television, about street-wise antiheroes whose playful use of colloquial dialect highlighted the disjunction between China's revolutionary past and the newly commercialized present, and mocked the former as 'not cool' (Barme 1992 Idol similarly celebrates Stephen Chow as a comic genius, while concluding that 'inexperienced youth' should be wary of idolizing his cynical blending of tradition and innovation because it may result in confusion and depression ('Zhou Xingchi' 2009 ). Liu Huifang is the central female character in China's first domestically produced soap opera, Kewang, which broadcast in October 1990, attracting a record audience of 550 million people (Wang et al. 1992: 177-92) . The 50-episode series followed the stories of several ordinary families from the Cultural Revolution period into the early 1980s, foregrounding issues relating to family relationships, class conflict, gender, and social morality. Its popularity stemmed in part from unprecedented media coverage. In 1980, there were 5 million television sets in the PRC; by the start of the 1990s there were 160 million (Wang et al. 1992: 181 
Conclusion
The history of celebrity and idol production in the PRC can be viewed crudely as marked by disjuncture: the decline of heavy-handed Party-state involvement in the propagandistic manufacturing of socialist idols of production, followed by the grafted- 
